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Abstract
In  this  paper,  I  intend  to  present  a  longitudinal  analysis  that  describes  and
contributes to explaining the entire cycle of one partner company’s involvement in an export
consortium. Thus, it will not be my purpose here to analyze a consortium or an alliance as a
whole (including the central core of collaboration and all the partner companies that take part
in  it)  but  rather  to  study  in  isolation  just  one  of  the  partner  companies  belonging  to  a
consortium. It is possible to analyze and assess the success or failure of an export consortium
as a whole, but I posit that it is even more important to measure and explain the level of
success or failure achieved by each of the individual partner companies, and their decisions
to join or to leave the consortium.
Keywords: Alliances, export consortia, export strategy, international, marketing 
(1) Presented at Concurrent Session 3.3 of the American Marketing Association Winter Marketing Educators’
Conference, February 16th-19th, 2001, Scottsdale, Arizona, USA.THE CYCLE OF A SINGLE COMPANY’S 
INVOLVEMENT IN AN EXPORT CONSORTIUM
1. The five possible levels of analysis of the alliance phenomenon
Recently,  a  number  of  authors  have  stated  the  desirability  of  studying  the
phenomenon of alliances between companies at different levels of analysis. For example,
Osborn and Hagedoorn (1997, page 265) say that “... we would expect and hope to see more
multilevel studies involving national, industry, firm and alliance levels of analysis”. In a
similar vein, Klein, Tossi and Canella (1999, page 243) say that “Multilevel theories span the
levels of organizational behavior and performance, typically describing some combination of
individuals, dyads, teams, businesses, corporations and industries... The result is a deeper,
richer  portrait  of  organizational  life  –  one  that  acknowledges  the  influence  of  the
organizational  context  on  individuals’  actions  and  perceptions  and  the  influence  of
individuals’ actions and perceptions on the organizational context”.
As discussed in Renart (1998b), the phenomenon of intercompany alliances as a
whole can be contemplated at five different levels of analysis.
1.1. First level of analysis
Constellations of alliances, which some authors call “networks”. The constellations
of alliances studied by a number of authors usually come under two categories: those existing
in a certain economic sector or those in which a given company or corporation is involved. In
the  first  sense,  for  example,  Nohria  and  García-Pont  (1991)  analyzed  the  strategic  blocs
existing  in  the  world  automotive  industry  between  1980  and  1990.  In  the  second  sense,
Yoshino and Rangan (1995) talk about the “Global Network Corporation”.
1.2. Second level of analysis
Specific alliances. At this level, we would consider the whole entity formed by two
or more partner companies plus the central core of cooperation, which may or may not have
its own separate legal status. Most of the extant bibliography contemplates alliances at this
level of analysis, often seeking to identify the key factors for the success or failure of an
alliance as a whole.Figure 1. An export consortium arbitrarily depicted as having 5 partner companies
1.3. Third level of analysis
Partner company belonging to an alliance. It seems necessary to analyze the success
or failure of one partner company belonging to an alliance, for at least four reasons:
1.3.1. Because different partner companies belonging to the same alliance may have
different strategic aims and different ultimate goals (which may be stated openly or kept in
their “hidden agendas”. See Nueno, 1999).
1.3.2. Because, almost always, the quantity and quality of the results achieved by an
individual partner company belonging to an alliance are different from those achieved by the
other partner companies belonging to the same alliance.
1.3.3. Because alliances with more than two partners may allow us to observe the
“bus phenomenon” (Renart 1997, page 57), that is, individual partner companies may join or
leave an alliance, but the alliance as a whole continues to be active and to operate.
21.3.4. Because, in many cases, asynchrony phenomena are observed when partner
companies join and/or leave a consortium or alliance. Therefore, it is necessary to explain
why a specific partner company decides to join or leave a consortium at a given time, while
other partner companies may decide to act otherwise.
1.4. Fourth level of analysis
At this fourth level of analysis, we would contemplate the behavior of a specific
individual who is involved in the design, operation or dissolution of an alliance. At this level
of analysis, our purpose would be to observe and explain the behavior of one of the actors,
the  behavior  of  a  specific  individual,  whose  decisions,  made  individually  or  in  a  team,
contribute  to  explaining  a  partner  company’s  conduct  as  a  whole  in  the  context  of  the
alliance. In turn, this contributes to explaining the phenomena observed within the alliance as
a whole. Although a researcher may seek to describe and explain the conduct of any of the
individual actors involved in an alliance, it seems that one of the most interesting players to
study is a partner company’s Permanent Representative in an alliance or consortium. By this,
we refer to the specific manager in a partner company who is responsible for representing
and defending his company’s interests within the context of the consortium or alliance. (See
point 2.2 in Renart, 1999.) Other important behaviors to be explained may be that of an
alliance or consortium’s Promoter and that of its General Manager.
1.5. Fifth level of analysis
At this level of analysis, we would contemplate each of the variables that contribute
to explaining a specific actor’s behavior. We are referring to variables such as the level of
trust that one person may have in another; or the perception of the level of fairness or equity
existing in an alliance; or the perception of the collaboration time horizon.
Thus, going “from the smallest to the largest”, from the “most micro” to the “most
macro”  level  of  analysis,  so  as  to  generate  a  very  complete  account  of  the  alliance
phenomenon, we can proceed in the following way:
We may try first to identify and to analyze the evolution of each of the variables (for
example, the existence or not of trust) that contribute to explain the behavior of one of the
key actors. If we are able to explain how and why a certain key actor involved in an alliance
acts as he does, we may be able to explain, in a similar manner, how and why the other
managers in his partner company behave the way they do. If so, perhaps we will be able to
arrive at a reasonable explanation of why a company belonging to a consortium behaves, as a
whole, the way it does. And if we are also able to explain, in a similar manner, the conduct of
each  and  every  one  of  the  partner  companies  belonging  to  an  alliance  or  a  consortium,
perhaps we will be able to explain what happens in the consortium or alliance as a whole.
2. The present third-level analysis
In this paper, we will concentrate on the third level of analysis, presenting a model
or descriptive framework that seeks to describe the motivations and behavior of an individual
partner company that decides to take part in a consortium or alliance.
3This individual partner company is considered in its entirety, that is, with all the
people and tangible and intangible commercial, economic-financial and knowledge resources
of which it is composed.
So far we do not yet seem to have any strategic alliance typology that is both broad
enough and universally accepted. Therefore, in order to avoid intersubjective variation as
much as possible, and to facilitate the discussion, I shall focus on examining the cycle of
involvement of a partner company in a particular type of alliance: an export consortium.
Export consortia are a particular variety of alliances formed by two or more companies for
the  purpose  of  jointly  developing  their  foreign  markets.  And  even  more  specifically,  the
discussion  will  center  on  a  particular  subtype  of  export  consortia:  the  so-called  focused
export consortia (Cexen, from the Spanish initials of “Consorcio de Exportación Enfocado”).
A Cexen has been defined in Renart (1998a and 1999) on the basis of nine specific
features characterizing the Cexen itself or the partner companies that are its members:
– It has 10 partner companies or less.
– It has an indeterminate duration at the time of formal incorporation.
– It may be a consortium created in the country of origin or in the export target
market.
– It is a horizontal alliance, that is, there are no significant supplier-customer
relationships between the partner companies.
– The  partner  companies  are  independent  of  each  other,  that  is,  there  are  no
controlling shareholding positions held by certain partners over others, nor are
there any common dominant shareholders.
– The  partner  companies  market  differentiated  (non-generic,  non-commodity)
products or services.
– The partner companies have a similar size and importance, that is, none of
them has a privileged position of power or dominance over the others as a
result of their large size or because they have products or a brand that are
market leaders, etc.
– The  partner  companies  take  on  a  relatively  high  degree  of  commercial,
economic and social commitment.
– The partner companies are prepared to design and implement a full-fledged
common export sales strategy (that is, they do not confine themselves to just
carrying out certain joint export sales promotion actions).
It is possible that the discussion that follows may be applicable to other types of
export consortia or, more generally, some parts of it may even be applicable to a wide variety
of alliances between companies. However, the specific degree of applicability to other types
of  consortia  or  alliances  will  depend  on  the  greater  or  lesser  degree  of  similarity  or
differentiation that each one may have with respect to a Cexen.
4Any reader interested in contemplating the subject of export consortia at the second
level of analysis can see Renart (1997).  This document explores the key success or failure
factors identified in the consortium as a whole (all partner companies plus the consortium
itself,  that  is,  plus  the  central  core  of  collaboration).  It  presents  the  Model  of  the  Two
Strategies, the Pseudo-matrix of Success Factors, and the Performance Measurement Model
for a Cexen in its entirety.
In order to carry out the present third-level analysis, that is, centered on analyzing
the cycle of involvement of an individual partner company in an export consortium, we will
use the diagram shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2. Cycle of involvement of a partner company in a focused export consortium (CEXEN)
Evolution over time of the variable “Total Motivation to Belong” (TMB) felt by the
permanent representative of a partner company to associate, keep associated or disassociate
his partner company from an export consortium.
3. Meaning of the axes or coordinates of Figure 2
3.1. The horizontal axis of Figure 2
As can be seen in Figure 2, the horizontal axis represents the time variable. The span
of time considered starts with the first event. This very frequently consists of a first encounter
between the Promoter of a new consortium and an executive of a potential partner company.
The last event included in this considered time span is either the moment a partner company
decides to individually leave the consortium (while the other partner companies may decide
to continue in it), or when the whole consortium is dissolved and ceases to exist as such. 
5How long does an export consortium last? No studies with a reasonable depth and
rigor seem to have been performed on the subject.
At one extreme, we can see that a certain number of attempted consortia do not even
reach the stage of formal incorporation, that is, they fail before they are born. And from the
real-life cases studied by this author, it appears that the gestation of an export consortium
may usually take between six months and two years. Obviously, to the duration of the period
of gestation, we would have to add the duration of the period of operation and the duration of
the period of dissolution.
At the other extreme, as shown in Figure 2, we propose that a well-designed, well-
managed export consortium could last indefinitely.
According to Castro and Moneu (1993), during the period 1985-1992, 95 export
consortia  were  incorporated  in  Spain  and  were  subsidized  by  ICEX  (the  Spanish  Export
Promotion Agency) under its Export Consortia Promotion Program. Out of these 95, 39 were
dissolved during the same period 1985-1992, while another 56 were classified by Castro and
Moneu as “currently operating”.
And according to the ICEX document “Report on Export Consortia in Spain”, in
April 1997, of the 206 consortia created with subsidies granted by ICEX between 1985 and
1996 “... at present, 165 (80 percent) continue to operate and therefore 41 (20 percent) have
been dissolved” (“Report”, page 13) (2). 
This would indicate that a significant percentage of the consortia supported by ICEX
subsidies survived beyond the initial subsidy period, which is currently four years.
It  is  to  be  remembered  that  the  duration  of  a  consortium  need  not  necessarily
coincide  with  the  duration  of  the  specific  period  of  participation  of  each  of  the  partner
companies participating in it. Indeed, some partner companies may join a consortium that is
already set up and operating, while some other individual member companies may decide to
quit a consortium that continues to operate. 
For example, in the export consortium Comercio Internacional del Vino, S.A. (Parés
and  Renart,  1990a  and  1994),  at  different  points  in  time  and  for  different  reasons,  three
partner companies quit and a new one joined. Thereby, a consortium that had been formally
incorporated with four partner companies ended up having just two partners, only one of
which was a founding partner.
Some Cexen may be very long-lasting. But using the limited data we have and the
occasional  observations  made  by  the  author  of  this  paper,  we  can  posit  that  an  export
consortium is a particular kind of alliance that usually has a relatively limited duration. While
we await more rigorous studies on the subject, we would estimate that, in Spain, most export
consortia have a total life cycle of between 6 (2 years’ gestation and 4 years’ operation) and
10 years.
In Spain, the most usual thing would seem to be for the partner companies to use the
consortium as an “export launch ramp”, that is, as a time-limited subsidized cooperation
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(2) According to information received by this author from ICEX, the total number of export consortia created
in Spain with ICEX subsidies between 1985 and 2000 was around 300. Therefore, the total number of
independent participating partner companies has been estimated by this author to be around 1500.mechanism.  This mechanism or vehicle would be dissolved or abandoned as soon as the
partner companies perceived that they had established a strategic platform allowing them to
continue exporting on their own.
Finally,  it  should  be  pointed  out  that  the  mere  duration  of  a  partner  company’s
involvement in a Cexen, that is, the duration of its membership, is probably not a reliable
indicator of the degree of success or failure achieved by that company. 
Indeed, a company may be a member for a long time but its involvement in the
consortium may be passive and apathetic, thus achieving poor results. In contrast, a partner
company may participate in an export consortium for a very short time, but during that time it
may be very active, thus achieving a high level of results in a short period of time. This may
enable the latter to leave the Cexen very quickly as it has already achieved a high degree of
success (see section 5.8 below of this paper).
3.1. The vertical axis of Figure 2
3.2.1. The TMB (Total Motivation to Belong to the consortium) variable
We  make  the  proposition  that  this  vertical  axis  measures  the  value  of  the  TMB
variable, which measures the Total Motivation to Belong to the consortium.
This motivation can be measured following, at least, two different theories:
a) Following  the  Anthropological  Theory  of  Motivation  proposed  by  Juan
Antonio Pérez López (1993), according to which the total motivation a person
has is a function of his extrinsic motivation, his intrinsic motivation and his
transcendent motivation. For an application of this theory to export consortia
and to alliances, see Renart (1999). This is the theory that we will follow in the
course of our discussion.
b) Or  following  Vroom’s  Theory  (1964),  according  to  which  a  person’s
motivation  to  perform  a  certain  action  is  the  product  of  his  expectations,
instrumentality and valence (3). For more information, see Galbraith (1977)
and/or Rodríguez Porras (1988).
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(3) According to Tubbs, Boehme and Dahl (1993, page 361), “... Vroom’s expectations theory is perhaps the
theory on motivation at work on which most research has been carried out”. Therefore, it can be taken as a
widely accepted theory in scientific literature. According to Vroom’s Dynamic Model, as presented by
Galbraith (1977, page 275), the course of action that a subject will choose to perform (among two or more
possible options) is determined by the product of the expectation (the subject believes that his action will
produce a first-order result) times the instrumentality (the first-order result will generate certain desired
second-order consequences), and times the valence (the subject believes that the second-order consequences
will have a positive value for him) of the different options considered.  And not only that, but it will also
determine the quantity of effort and tenacity with which the subject will carry out the action optionally
chosen. This effort, combined with his skill, will give rise to a certain level of performance, which will give
rise to the obtainment of certain extrinsic and intrinsic rewards (Galbraith, page 253). In this paper, we have
preferred to follow Pérez López’s Anthropological Theory of Motivation (1993). As I have explained in
detail in Renart (1999), this theory not only includes intrinsic and extrinsic motivation but also takes into
account the possible existence of transcendent or altruistic motivation. That is, it includes the possibility
that the subject will also act moved by the consequences that his actions will have for third parties.This TMB variable is similar to the “CL-alt” variable used by Anderson and Narus
(1990, page 43) in the context of the exchange relationships existing in a distribution channel
between a manufacturer and a distributor.
We formally define TMB as the total motivation felt by the permanent representative
of a partner company to associate his partner company with a Cexen, or keep it associated,
when in his decisions and actions the permanent representative takes into account all the
needs and interests of the partner company he represents (4).
The value of this TMB variable (Total Motivation to Belong to the consortium) at
any point in time will be the difference, or perceived “net balance”, between the sum of all
the  advantages  or  benefits  that  a  partner  company  expects  to  generate  through  its
involvement  in  the  consortium,  and  the  costs  that  this  involvement  or  participation  will
entail.
Bucklin and Sengupta (1993, page 35) use the expression “project payoff”, defined
as “... the alliance’s strategic value, after discounting its development costs”.
Ariño, García-Canal and Valdés (1999), following Madhok and Tallman (1998), talk
of  the  “realized  value”  by  one  of  the  partner  companies  as  “the  difference  between  the
revenues generated by certain specialized resources and the management costs or expenses
incurred that are specifically associated with operating through a strategic alliance”.
We can accept these definitions. However, we want to point out that, in our analysis,
we include more than just the strictly economic costs or benefits of participating in an export
consortium. Both revenues and costs should be understood in a broad sense, that is, also
including the value of the learning generated, and the changes that have taken place in the
level of the moral virtues of the people taking part in the alliance. For a discussion of the
main advantages and disadvantages of being a participating member of an export consortium,
see Renart (1997, pages 24-27).
3.2.2. The “TMalt” variable (alternative Total Motivation)
However, a manager who is weighing up the possibility of his company joining a
Cexen may also feel attracted to or motivated by the idea of his company doing things in the
field of export other than belonging to an export consortium.
First, he may feel motivated not to attempt to export, that is, he may feel inclined or
attracted to devote all of his company’s sales effort to developing its own domestic market.
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(4) Although we will not go into more detail here, let us point out that there may arise certain situations of role
conflict of interests. At a given point in time and faced with a particular decision, the same person may pay
greater or less attention to what motivates him as an individual, to what motivates him as the Permanent
Representative  of  a  partner  company  in  a  consortium,  or  to  what  motivates  him  as  a  manager  of  the
consortium itself, that is, serving the interests of the consortium as a whole. For example, when faced with
the decision to attend or not to attend an international trade show, the same person may feel motivated to
attend because it is in the best interest of the consortium as a whole to attend (for example, because the
consortium is just starting its export activities and needs to establish and strengthen links with prospective
international  customers  and/or  distributors).  But,  at  the  same  time,  he  may  feel  unmotivated  to  attend
because this fair in particular does not fit in very well with him own company’s export strategy. And,
finally, he may also feel unmotivated to attend on the basis of him own personal interest as an individual,
because he would prefer to spend that particular weekend with her wife and children.Second, even though he may feel attracted or motivated to export, he may choose to
export following various strategies other than joining a consortium. He has the possibility of
choosing the “home-based export marketing strategy” which seems most attractive to him,
that is, the strategy for which he perceives or considers (rightly or wrongly) that the balance
of the benefits minus the costs will be highest.
As  explained  in  greater  detail  in  Renart  (1997),  in  addition  to  choosing  the
alternative strategy of “not exporting”, the manager may also choose one of the following
strategic alternatives: 
a) Use salaried employees (hiring or appointing an Export Manager);
b) Use the services of an export agent located in the same country of origin (see,
for example, the case study “Cavas Masachs” by Parés and Renart, 1987a); 
b) Join  an  international  alliance  with  reciprocal  exchange  of  sales  services,
formed with another company located in another country (see, for example, the
case study “Troll-AEG” by Parés and Renart, 1992).
I posit that, at any given time, a partner company’s permanent representative will
feel a certain degree of motivation to choose and implement any one of these “home-based
export marketing strategies”, including the strategic option of not exporting.
I define “TMalt” as the highest motivation value that a partner company feels, at any
given time, to choose and implement a home-based export marketing strategy other than
joining a consortium, including the option to not export. In short, it is as if such permanent
representative was asked, “If your company did not join the consortium, what other home-
based export strategy would you be most likely to choose?”.
For example, we could design a scale for measuring motivation that went arbitrarily
from  0  to  100.    Then  we  could  put  the  above  question  to  the  manager  of  a  company
considering the possibility of joining a consortium.
He might answer, for example, “We have a total motivation to continue devoting
ourselves  solely  to  our  domestic  market  (that  is,  not  to  export)  of  70.  We  have  a  total
motivation to export using salaried employees of 10. We have a total motivation to export
using an export agent at origin of 30. We have a total motivation to export using an alliance
involving the exchange of sales services with a company located in another country of 2; and
we have a total motivation to export by joining a consortium of 15.”   
A  company  that  gave  this  answer  would  not  be  exporting  because,  of  all  the
alternative strategic options considered, the one that attracts it most is to continue devoting
itself solely to its domestic market, that is, not to attempt to export.
On the vertical axis of Figure 2, we compare, at each moment in time, the value of
TMB with the value of TMalt. TMB is the Total Motivation to Belong, or to continue to
belong, to a Cexen. And TMalt is the Total Motivation to choose and to implement the most
attractive of the various alternative home-based export strategies, including the option not to
export.
As we will see further on, at any given time and for any given partner company, one
of the three following possibilities may occur:
9Either TMB > TMalt
Or TMB = TMalt
Or TMB < TMalt
In  Figure  2,  to  simplify,  we  have  kept  the  value  of  TMalt  arbitrarily  constant,
varying the value of TMB with respect to TMalt over time.
4. The events or incidents
We  define  an  “event”  as  any  incident  that  occurs  during  the  cycle  of  a  partner
company’s involvement in a Cexen. The occurrence of such an event can produce changes in
the value of TMB, or in the value of TMalt, for a given partner company, thereby increasing
or decreasing its motivation to belong to the consortium compared with TMalt.
For example, one such event may consist of the following: the CEO of a potential
partner company did not know that ICEX had an Export Consortium Promotion Program
which can subsidize between 40 and 50 percent of most of a consortium’s expenses for a
period of four years. Then, one way or another, he finds out. The mere fact of finding this out
may increase the value of TMB, that is, the degree of motivation he has to participate in an
export consortium. 
A contrasting example would be as follows: A partner company has already joined a
Cexen and its permanent representative realizes that the consortium’s General Manager does
not  have  the  management  skills  he  was  expected  to  have.  The  fact  that  the  permanent
representative becomes aware of this fact may decrease the value of TMB, that is, it may
diminish the motivation to continue belonging to the Cexen.
To put it in more general terms, an “event” is any incident capable of modifying
(increasing or decreasing) a partner company’s total motivation to belong to the consortium.
This is so because it is able to modify any of its components. According to Pérez López’s
Anthropological  Motivation  Theory  (1993),  an  event  may  modify  the  partner  company’s
extrinsic and/or intrinsic and/or trascendent motivation. The extrinsic motivation has to do
with the rewards the company expects to obtain from exporting more, at a greater profit and
with less risk. The intrinsic motivation has to do with how much a partner company enjoys
exporting, or how much it is learning from taking part in the alliance.  And the transcendent
or altruistic motivation has to do with the degree of moral virtues of the various corporate
players involved.
The above two examples also help us see that, following Peterson (1998), an event
can be considered as “a particle” or as “a wave”. An event can be something that manifests
itself all at once.  Or it may be something that manifests itself at the end of a certain cycle or
process. For example, someone may reach the conclusion that it is necessary to replace a
consortium’s Manager after a gradual accumulation of negative or unfortunate incidents, the
last of which is “the straw that breaks the camel’s back”.
As we will see below, over the cycle of a partner company’s involvement in a Cexen
hundreds or even thousands of events may occur. Any and all of them may, at any given time,
change  (increase  or  decrease)  the  total  motivation  to  belong  or  continue  belonging  to  a
consortium felt by the partner company’s permanent representative in the Cexen.
10A “positive” event may consist of obtaining a big export order, for example. And a
“negative“ event may consist of having a customer who does not pay his bills in time. Other
examples may include identifying and recruiting, or losing, a good sales agent in a target
country for exports. Or a favorable or unfavorable change in currency exchange rates. Or
perceiving the generosity or selfishness of the other permanent representatives; being granted
or refused a subsidy; perceiving the consortium Manager’s loyalty or opportunism, etc. 
Any incident or event such as these may modify the quantity and quality of the TMB
felt by a partner company’s permanent representative (5).
For an analysis of the concept of event as a process unit in organizational science,
see Peterson (1998).  Ariño and De La Torre (1998) identify 14 events to account for the
evolution of an alliance between two companies (NAMCO and Hexagon). They use them to
develop an explanatory model of an alliance’s evolution. However, these authors consider the
event to be not so much an incident capable of changing a partner company’s motivation to
continue  belonging  to  the  alliance,  as  an  incident  capable  of  affecting  the  relationship
between the two partners.
5. The cycle of involvement of a partner company in a focused export consortium
(CEXEN)
5.1. The initial situation
In order to start our description of the cycle of involvement of a partner company in
a consortium, we place ourselves at a certain moment in time, just before the beginning of the
first event that has to do with a company’s future hypothetical involvement in a Cexen.
This  first  event  usually  consists  of  a  contact  between  a  senior  manager  of  the
prospective partner company and the consortium’s Promoter. In Figure 2, this moment is
marked (1).
It seems obvious that, at this first initial moment, the company does not yet belong
to the Cexen. Therefore, at this point, TMB < TMalt obtains. That is, the partner company
feels more attracted by not exporting, or by exporting by means of any other home-based
export strategy, than by exporting through participating in an export consortium.
For example, in the case study “Comercio Internacional para el Hábitat, S.A. (A)”, it
is  said  that  all  four  furniture  manufacturers  that  eventually  formed  the  consortium  were
already exporting on their own before forming the consortium.
5.2. First event
The initial situation is altered because a first event occurs that is capable of changing
the quantity or quality of the TMB of the partner company studied. Assuming that this first
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(5) Of course, events or incidents such as those described here can also be capable of changing the degree of
motivation to continue belonging to the Cexen felt by other relevant actors, such as, for example, the
Cexen’s Manager. We will not explore these other consequences in detail here because we are describing
and analyzing the life cycle of a partner company’s involvement in a Cexen and not the evolution of the
Cexen as a whole.event had some duration and that we could measure the value of the TMB variable at the start
and at the end of the event, we would be likely to find that:
TMB (E1S) < TMB (E1E)
That is, the value of the TMB variable at the start of Event 1 would be lower than
the value of the TMB variable at the end of Event 1. To put it another way, Event 1 may have
increased the quantity or quality of the focal partner company’s TMB (Total Motivation to
Belong to the export consortium).
For example, in the case study of the Spanish Building Materials, S.A. (SPABUMA)
consortium, the first triggering event is clearly apparent when it is mentioned that “... in May
1983, Mr. Arce attended the official presentation of ICEX in Alicante. At the same meeting,
Mr. Arce became aware for the first time of the existence of financial subsidies provided by
ICEX to groupings of manufacturers that acted jointly in opening their foreign markets...”.
However, in spite of the increase in the value of TMB, it is to be assumed that even
after completion of the first event, it was still true that:
TMB < TMalt
This means that in spite of the increase in the Total Motivation to Belong to the
consortium, this motivation was still less than Mr. Arce’s motivation to implement any other
home-based export strategy, including the strategic option of not exporting. 
In fact, at that time, Mr. Arce’s company was not yet exporting, that is, there was
another alternative that motivated him more. We could interpret this to mean that the option
of joining a consortium had already been presented to him, whereas this option did not exist
before Event 1 because of his lack of knowledge. However, even after this first event, the
option  to  create  or  join  a  consortium  was  still  unclear,  undeveloped  and,  therefore,  still
relatively unattractive, or less attractive than carrying on not exporting, which was what he
was doing at that time.
This example seems to agree with the viewpoint of Welch and Joynt (1987, page
59), who mention that in some cases the stimuli in favor of the grouping are clear, even
pressing. In other cases, initially they are latent, that is, they are not manifest but only emerge
when  information  is  received  about  the  possibilities  of  grouping  and  this  information  is
reflected on.
5.3. Subsequent events
The  potential  partner-company  (6)  may  decide  to  continue  or  not  to  continue
exploring the possibility of joining an export consortium. If it decides, for the time being, to
continue to be involved in the process of planning the future Cexen (a process described in
more detail in Renart (1996), and Renart (1997), pages 44-45), then this first event will be
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(6) Obviously, we must clarify that in the early stages of the consortium gestation process, which we are
describing at this point, the partner-company is not yet a formal partner of anything. This is because the
consortium has not yet been formally incorporated. It is only taking part in exploratory conversations,
which may or may not bear fruit. In fact, we should really refer to it as “the candidate company which, if
everything goes well, later on and after a process of maturing, may decide to formally join the consortium”.followed by a series of further events. Each of them may generate an increase or decrease in
the value of the TMB variable.
Subsequent  events  may  have  a  positive  outcome;  in  other  words,  they  may
contribute, to a greater or lesser extent, to shaping the proposed consortium.  They may allow
the Cexen gestation process to progress. If so, one may observe a process of rapprochement
or relationship building between the partner companies.
Positive events occurring in this gestation stage might include: 
– Identifying other partner companies interested in joining the consortium; 
– Performing a preliminary market survey to confirm that there is a demand for
the partner companies’ products in the target export markets; 
– Designing an export sales strategy between all the partner companies; 
– Translating this strategy into a quantified feasibility plan that has a chance of
being accepted by ICEX for a subsidy, etc.
Obviously, however, not all the events that occur during this stage will bring about
an increase in the value of the TMB variable. Most likely some events will lead to a decrease
in the value of TMB. In other words, after a certain event a particular partner company’s
motivation to take part in the proposed Cexen may have decreased.
We are referring to events such as: 
– Finding  it  very  difficult  or  even  impossible  to  identify  and  recruit  other
companies willing to take part in the consortium gestation process. 
– Organizing  a  preliminary  meeting  with  companies  that  are  potentially
interested  in  joining,  but  finding  that  their  strategic  export  interests  do  not
match. 
– Finding that there is not enough trust between the participants. 
– Finding that the proposed export consortium is highly unlikely to be eligible
for an ICEX subsidy, etc.
Both positive and negative events may affect all the partner companies, or just some,
or even just one of them.
Likewise, each event may alter the motivation of all the companies involved in the
consortium gestation process in the same way or in different ways; in other words, any given
event may be motivating for one company and demotivating for another. For example, one of
the companies taking part in the gestation process of a Cexen may be very interested in
creating an export consortium to export to China, and yet the others may decide that the
priority market to penetrate with their exports is the US market (7).
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(7) Note that this decision to choose the US as the Cexen’s priority target market could discourage the partner
company that wished to export to China to the point that it could decide to withdraw from the gestation
process. However, it could also end up being persuaded by the others to accept their decision to concentrate
primarily on exporting to the US and continue to be an active participant in the consortium.Some events may take place within the context of the consortium (for example, a
disagreement between partners about the procedure for deciding the amount of the economic
contribution to be made by each member). Others may occur in the general socioeconomic
environment (for example, a change in the currencies’ parity). Yet others may occur within
one of the partner companies (for example, if one of them goes into temporary receivership
for reasons unrelated to the consortium).
If the value of a particular partner company’s TMB were to progressively fall, it
would  eventually  reach  a  certain  very  low  value,  which  in  Figure  2  we  have  called
“TMBmin” and have marked as (2). This value is not even enough to motivate the partner
company to continue taking part in the gestation of the Cexen and, consequently, it may
decide  to  leave  the  process  of  gestation  of  the  consortium,  even  before  its  formal
incorporation.
5.4. Reaching the point where TMB = TMalt
If a particular partner company continues to take part in the consortium’s gestation
process, the value of its TMB may suffer ups and downs as a consequence of successive
events. But if, on the whole, there are more increases than decreases in the level of its TMB,
there may come a time when, for that particular company,
TMB = TMalt
At  this  point,  that  company’s  motivation  to  become  involved  in  the  proposed
consortium is equal to  its motivation to implement any other home-based export strategy,
including the option to not export. This point is identified in Figure 2 as point (3). This
company would thus have attained a “point of indifference” at which it feels equally attracted
to either option.
Reaching this point at which TMB = TMalt is a very subtle event that may be
difficult  to  detect.  Something  “clicks”  in  the  mind  of  the  partner  company’s  permanent
representative. It is as if he suddenly realizes that it all makes sense and fits.
Until  then,  the  permanent  representative  will  probably  have  had  an  attitude
something  like:  “Well,  I  have  nothing  against  exploring  the  possibility  of  my  company
joining this tentative consortium, but remember, I’m still not committed to anything. We’re
talking about it, but I’m still not sure that my company will join. Because, until now, there is
still another home-based export strategy that continues to attract me more than the strategy of
joining a consortium.”
However,  if  as  a  result  of  other  subsequent  positive  events,  the  value  of  TMB
continues to increase, there may come a time when TMB > TMalt. If so, the permanent
representative’s  attitude  and  way  of  thinking  may  become  something  like  the  following:
“Well, the truth of the matter is that it’s becoming increasingly clear to me that it is in my
company’s best interest to join the consortium. I think it’s increasingly likely we will end up
becoming a member. But I’ve still not signed anything yet.”
If this happens and the value of TMB continues to increase, the partner company in
question enters what I call the “period of entry latency” (marked (4) in Figure 2).
14Indeed,  the  Cexen  has  still  not  been  formally  incorporated,  but  the  permanent
representative already “feels inside it”. Or, alternatively, he might say, “Things would have to
go seriously wrong for our company not to sign and join this consortium we are gestating...”.
In a way, the burden of proof has been reversed. Before this point was reached, the
permanent  representative  may  have  been  thinking,  “I’m  looking  from  the  outside  in  and
you’ve  still  got  to  convince  me  that  it’s  worth  our  while  joining”.  Now  he  thinks,  “I’m
already inside the consortium in my mind, and barring negative incidents or setbacks, we
already consider ourselves participating members”.
Although  in  this  paper  we  are  observing  the  evolution  of  a  particular  partner
company’s degree of motivation to join a Cexen, it should be pointed out that, by definition,
several  partner  companies  are  taking  part  in  the  same  gestation  process  of  a  particular
consortium. And that the evolution of their respective TMBs is probably not synchronized. 
To put it another way, at any given time during the gestation of a consortium by, say,
six partner companies, we might find that: 
– For three of the six companies, TMB > TMalt, that is, they are already sure that
they will probably join.
– One of the six partner companies has reached the point at which TMB = TMalt,
that is, it has reached the point of indifference.
– And for the other two companies, TMB < TMalt, that is, they are still not
convinced and are still considering one or more alternative home-based export
strategies  that  attract  them  more  than  the  strategy  of  joining  an  export
consortium. Therefore, it is still possible that some of the participants in the
gestation process will become demotivated, reach their “TMBmin” level and
withdraw from the negotiations. 
Something  like  this  may  have  happened  during  the  gestation  of  the  Comercio
Internacional para el Hábitat, S.A. (CIH) consortium (see case study “CIH (A)”, page 8) on
the occasion of the event entitled “A last-minute desertion”. At that point in time, almost at
the end of a gestation process that had been under way for nine months (March-December
1984),  and  just  “...  one  week  before  the  contracts  were  to  be  signed,  one  of  the  five
companies, a manufacturer of lighting components, decided to withdraw...”.   The company
said that it had just received orders from abroad that doubled its export sales expectations for
the following year. 
Executives from the same company also gave other reasons for their decision to
leave the gestation process. They had to do with the economic contribution to be made by
each partner to finance the consortium, which had been recently agreed and set at 10 percent
of the ex-factory value of each partner company’s exports. 
Indeed, based on the information given in the CIH case study, it is impossible to say
for sure whether this company ever actually reached the point at which TMB = TMalt. What
does seem to be unquestionable is that at the moment of truth, at the time of deciding whether
or not to make a formal commitment to the consortium, it chose not to take part, declaring
that “... we think we can manage on our own” (“CIH (A)”, page 9). Evidently this company’s
managers perceived a strategic option (to export or to continue exporting alone) that was
15more attractive to them than that of joining the Cexen.  In other words, the value of their
TMB was lower than the value of their TMalt.
In contrast, an event may generate a sudden and general increase in the TMBs of all
the companies taking part in the consortium’s gestation process.  In the wake of such an
event, all the partner companies may be suddenly convinced that their best option is to go
ahead and have the consortium incorporated.
Something  like  this  may  have  happened  during  the  gestation  of  the  “Chemical
Labour Grouping” alliance (see Parés and Renart, 1999b, page 9).  On that occasion, “... the
English participant proposed that they start their cooperation efforts by coordinating their raw
material purchasing policies, [an area in which] cooperation would offer undoubted economic
advantages for all four [partner companies that were gestating the agreement], as by buying
jointly and in coordination it would be possible to obtain discounts [of up to] 30 percent on
average”.
A little further on in the case study, Joseba Garmendia, the permanent representative
of the Spanish company taking part in the process, adds, “I think that that was precisely the
point of no return, [as from then on] none of the four thought whether they should reconsider
about cooperating or not. It was obvious that it was beneficial and useful to cooperate, and
that the best option was to continue”.
The period of entry latency is likely to be relatively short, but at the same time, it
should enable all the partner companies taking part in the gestation of the Cexen to have
TMB > TMalt. 
Although all are convinced that they will join, it may still take some time to draw up
the documents for formal incorporation (the Cexen’s articles of association, etc.) and to select
and recruit the Cexen’s General Manager, etc.
5.5. The moment of formal incorporation of the CEXEN
If for all the partner companies taking part in the gestation process TMB > TMalt
and  the  ten  stages  described  in  Renart  (1996)  have  been  completed,  the  process  will
culminate in the formal incorporation of the consortium (marked (5) in Figure 2).
At that stage, the permanent representative of each of the partner companies must
reconfirm his/her willingness to formally participate in the incorporation of the consortium.
If  so,  each  will  be  prepared  to  undertake,  either  individually  or  jointly,  a  five-fold
commitment:
– A jointly undertaken commitment by the consortium’s Board of Directors to
ICEX,  assuming  it  has  applied  for  ICEX  approval  and  the  corresponding
subsidy under ICEX’s Export Consortium Program.
– A jointly undertaken commitment by the consortium’s Board of Directors to
the consortium’s Manager, if he/she has already been recruited.
– A jointly undertaken commitment by the consortium’s Board of Directors to
itself.
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representative to his own company’s governing bodies.
– And,  finally,  an  individually  undertaken  commitment  by  each  partner
company’s permanent representative to himself.
It must also be pointed out that the undertakings may be of three kinds. They may be
commercial  commitments  (for  example,  the  commitment  to  export  preferentially  to
a particular  country  or  group  of  countries).  They  may  be  economic  commitments  (a
commitment by each partner company at the time of incorporation of the consortium to pay
its  share  in  the  form  of  subscriptions  to  the  consortium’s  shares).  And  they  may  be
constitutional  commitments  (commitments  regulating  how  the  Permanent  Representatives
interrelate, e.g. how the Chairman of the consortium’s Board of Directors is to be chosen).
Although we have said that the consortium will not be formally incorporated until
all the participating companies have TMB > TMalt, there may be exceptional cases in which,
for one particular partner company, TMB < TMalt still holds.
A partner company may agree to be a party to the incorporation of the Cexen even
though it would prefer to pursue a different home-based export strategy. This apparently
anomalous conduct may be due to a certain constitutional commitment towards the other
partner  companies.    Or  by  a  desire  to  “keep  its  options  open”  and  have  the  choice  of
becoming more fully involved in the consortium if it later proves to be viable and operates
successfully.
This  is  what  may  have  happened  in  the  Coextex  consortium,  in  which  “...nine
companies agreed to take part [in the formal incorporation of the consortium], although one
of them [Tarrabadell, S.A.] played almost no active role and soon quit the consortium” (case
study “Coextex (B)”, page 2).
Obviously, until it is incorporated, the Cexen does not exist as such. From then on,
however, particularly if a new body has been created with a separate legal identity –perhaps
an  Economic  Interest  Grouping  (EIG)–  then  the  consortium  can  really  come  into  full
operation.
From the viewpoint of analyzing the cycle of a partner company’s involvement in a
consortium, it can be assumed that the formal act of incorporation is a time of justified
individual and collective pride. It is to be assumed, therefore, that it is a fairly significant
event that will further boost a company’s TMB.
5.6. The period of rapprochement or relationship building
After the formal incorporation of the Cexen, once it has started to operate, one may
note a certain “honeymoon effect”. At this stage everything is new, discoveries are made, the
companies learn how to design and implement an export strategy as a team, and perhaps the
first export orders are won. Positive events during this “honeymoon” may increase the value
of each partner company’s TMB.
In  Figure  2  we  have  suggested  that  the  Cexen’s  gestation  process  is  a  steady
progression, despite the occasional setback, and that the local partner company has remained
involved in the process (that is to say, at no stage has its motivation fallen to the “TMBmin”
level, prompting it to withdraw from the process). If this is the case, we can see that between
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period of time has passed that we shall call the “period of rapprochement or relationship
building”.
During  this  first  period  of  time,  in  the  complete  cycle  of  a  partner  company’s
involvement in a Cexen, the TMB will have a reasonably consistent tendency to increase.
When we say “reasonably” we mean that we accept that during this period of time events
may occur that may generate a temporary decrease in a partner company’s TMB. However,
on  the  whole,  over  this  period  of  time  the  trend  will  have  been  increasing,  that  is,  the
motivation to be involved in the Cexen will have tended to increase.
During this period the relationship has been built up. The permanent representatives
of the partner companies have been identified. They have got to know each other, and formal
and informal links have been established between them. Their respective companies have
committed to each other, probably in the form of articles of association and/or contracts that
will govern the Cexen’s corporate life. Informal and reciprocal links of knowledge, friendship
and trust have emerged.
Welch,  Welch,  Wilkinson  and  Young  (1996,  page  471)  point  out  how  in  the
Australian  export  consortium  they  studied  “...  this  informal  network  has  become  the
foundation of the group, to the extent that members seem to regard the formal meetings as
being of far less importance”.
And  towards  the  end  of  their  article  (page  473)  they  add  that  “...although  less
visible, in the end [this informal network of contacts between partners] may well be the most
important outcome of the scheme”. 
It is difficult to say exactly how long this period of relationship building may last.
We  suggest,  though,  that  there  comes  a  time  when  the  relationship  between  the  partner
companies and the permanent representatives and the Cexen’s Manager has been built, is
established and operates.
At the same time, the consortium’s commercial export operations enter a certain
phase of “normality”, in which the planned export activities are carried out: trade fairs are
attended, customers or importers are acquired in the target countries, the first export orders
are received and delivered, and so on.
Subtly,  and  perhaps  imperceptibly,  the  consortium  moves  from  the  period  of
relationship  building  to  the  period  of  relative  stability  in  the  relationships  between  the
partners.
5.7. The period of relative stability of the TMB
Once the Cexen has been formally incorporated and has started to operate, events
will continue to occur that are capable of increasing or decreasing a partner company’s TMB.
Designing and implementing a joint export strategy takes time. Months may go by
before the first export orders are received. Then export sales must be consolidated; it is not
enough to receive a few sporadic orders from foreign customers. Regular orders are needed.
18The value of a partner company’s TMB will increase if events such as the following
occur: 
– The  consortium  succeeds  in  identifying  and  appointing  good  importer-
distributors in certain export target countries; 
– Over time these importer-distributors prove that they can be relied on, that they
meet their commercial and financial commitments, and that they are capable of
reselling the partner company’s products in their respective countries; 
– The partner company, and its permanent representative, see that not only are
they  starting  to  export  but  also  that  they  are  learning  how  to  export  and
becoming more knowledgeable about foreign markets, etc.
Clearly, these and other favourable events (events capable of increasing the value of
a partner company’s TMB) may take place within the context of a “forward export marketing
strategy”. This is a marketing strategy the consortium pursues in order to penetrate foreign
markets.
But as Renart points out (1997, page 28), one of the distinctive features of an export
consortium is having to design and implement two sales strategies simultaneously: a forward
strategy and a backward strategy. The backward strategy, also known as the internal strategy,
defines the relationships between the consortium and its partner companies, and the partner
companies’ relationships with each other.
Consequently, during the cycle of a partner company’s involvement in a Cexen,
which we are reviewing here in accordance with Figure 2 above, any events that take place
may occur in the context of either of these two strategies.
To put it another way, events may occur in the context of the backward strategy that
increase the value of a partner company’s Total Motivation to Belong (TMB).
I mean, for example, events such as the consortium’s Manager showing that he is
capable of taking positive corporate and sales initiatives. Or that he is a neutral party who
is able  to  function  effectively  as  a  mediator  when  disputes  or  tensions  arise,  seeking
negotiated  solutions  that  are  acceptable  to  all  the  partners.  Also,  the  permanent
representatives get to know each other better and begin to trust each other because they see
that there is a reasonable degree of selflessness and good will on all sides, etc.
However, before we are accused of adopting excessively optimistic and positive
viewpoints, let us hasten to point out that, obviously, both in the context of the forward
strategy  and  in  the  context  of  the  backward  strategy,  events  may  occur  that  generate  a
decrease in one of the partner companies’ TMB.
This  could  happen  in  the  context  of  the  forward  strategy:  if,  for  example,  after
performing suitable sales actions of a certain intensity and for a certain amount of time, the
company still does not manage to win export orders or the orders it obtains are not profitable
or there are problems in collecting payment, etc.
Or, in the context of the backward strategy, if there is not the right atmosphere of
collaboration between the permanent representatives or between the representatives and the
consortium’s  Manager.  Or  if  examples  of  opportunistic  behavior  by  other  partners  are
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such incidents are difficult to resolve, leaving all sides unsatisfied, etc.
All  of  these  examples  serve  to  make  the  point  that,  even  during  the  period  of
effective operation of the consortium, a great variety of events, some positive, some negative,
may occur that may increase or decrease a company’s Total Motivation to Belong (TMB).
Generally speaking, during this stage of the cycle of a company’s involvement in a
Cexen, the general impression will be that the value of the company’s TMB has entered a
period of relative stability. The company plays an active role in the consortium’s activities
and, in spite of any ups and downs in its TMB, the value of its Total Motivation to Belong
will remain clearly above the value of its TMalt.
Nevertheless,  it  is  reasonable  to  expect  that,  from  time  to  time,  the  company’s
permanent representative in the Cexen may ask himself a key question: “Should we continue
belonging  to  this  export  consortium  or  would  it  be  better  for  us  to  leave  and  continue
exporting by some other means? Would it be better for our company to continue exporting on
its own?”
Once again, subtly and almost imperceptibly, after a certain period of time a partner
company may start to move on to the next stage or period.
5.8. The period of drawing apart or deterioration of the relationship
As shown in the top right corner of Figure 2, a partner company’s involvement in a
well designed, well managed Cexen could probably continue indefinitely.
This would imply that, in the view of the company’s permanent representative, the
advantages of belonging to the Cexen still exceed the disadvantages. It would also imply that
he considers that the net balance of the company’s membership of the export consortium
(advantages minus disadvantages) continues to be greater than the net balance he thinks or
perceives that implementation of any other home-based export strategy, including the option
to not export, would give. That is, he thinks something along the following lines, “It’s better
that we continue participating in this Cexen rather than trying to embark upon exporting
alone”, or “It’s more in our interest to continue in the consortium than to stop exporting”.
After a certain time, however, all or some of the partner companies belonging to a
Cexen may start to enter the final stage of the cycle, called drawing apart or deterioration of
the relationship. In other words, one can see a more or less constant and reiterated tendency
for the events that occur to generate, more often than not, decreases in the value of the TMB.
What causes this progressive de-motivation?
Turning again to Pérez López’s Anthropological Theory of Motivation (1993), we
could say that the demotivation could occur for extrinsic, intrinsic or transcendent reasons.
Or it may occur due to any combination, in a negative direction, of these three components of
motivation.
We may mention at least two examples of demotivation for extrinsic reasons (that is,
due to a lack of “tangible rewards” produced by the efforts made to export):
20A) At the end of its fourth year of existence, a Cexen incorporated in Spain will
cease  to  be  entitled  to  receive  the  ICEX’s  subsidy  from  its  Export  Consortia  Promotion
Program.  At  that  point,  the  partner  companies  may  well  ask  themselves  whether  it  is
advisable and desirable to remain in the consortium, now that they will have to foot the bill
for all its expenses.
B) In the case of the Coextex consortium (“Coextex (B)”), “... Mas [the consortium’s
Manager]  suspected  that  Jaume  Pi  S.A.  and  Texseda  [two  of  the  consortium’s  partner
companies] could be thinking about leaving the consortium, given the low level of [export]
sales they were attaining, and the unfavorable consequences that the application of the new
expense  allocation  system  would  have  for  them”.  (The  expense  allocation  system  had
recently been reviewed at the request of another partner company.)
De-motivation  for  intrinsic  reasons  may  easily  occur  if,  after  a  few  years  of
belonging  to  the  Cexen,  a  partner  company  comes  to  the  conclusion  that  it  has  already
learned how to export, that it has “satisfied its thirst to learn how to export” and feels capable
of going it alone. Or that actions which previously seemed amusing or interesting because of
their novelty have now become boring, tedious or repetitive.
Finally, demotivation for transcendent reasons may occur, for example, if any of the
permanent representatives observes that another permanent representative or the Manager is
engaging  in  fraudulent  or  unethical  activities.  Or,  worse  still,  if  by  majority  vote  of  the
Cexen’s Board of Directors, a partner company is forced to take part in ethically questionable
group activities against its will.
It is important to stress that the demotivation process, and the consequent period of
pulling apart or deterioration in the relationship between partner companies, may be due to a
lack of success in the consortium’s export efforts made, or even too much export success.
We have already mentioned an example of firms leaving a consortium because of
insufficient success (Coextex). An example of the opposite case can be found in the “CIH
(B)” case study.  At the beginning of the consortium’s third year, the first partner company to
announce its intention to leave is precisely the company that was exporting most. The text of
the case study does not give more details, but we may surmise that, having achieved a certain
level of export sales, this company felt that it would be easier, quicker, and perhaps even
more  profitable  for  them  to  continue  exporting  on  their  own  rather  than  stay  with  the
consortium.
Easier and quicker, because it would not have to coordinate its export sales activities
with the other partner companies. More profitable, because being the company that exported
most,  it  was  also  –under  the  consortium’s  articles  of  association–  the  company  that
contributed most to financing the Cexen in absolute terms.
Once  again  we  see  that,  besides  being  related  to  extrinsic  motivation,  intrinsic
motivation  or  transcendent  motivation,  the  events  generating  demotivation  may  also  be
taking place within the context of the forward strategy or within the context of the backward
strategy.
Furthermore, following Chinchilla (1996), we can say that this process of drawing
apart or deterioration of the relationship can manifest itself in either of two ways, or in any
combination of the two:
21a) Because of a decrease in TMB, that is, a decrease in the motivation to continue
belonging  to  the  Cexen,  which  would  generate  a  push-type  situation  (“I’m
leaving the consortium”).
b)  Because of an increase in TMalt, that is, an increase in the appeal of some
other home-based export strategy. This would generate a pull-type situation
(“I’m going to pursue a home-based export strategy”).
Also, partly following Pauwels and Matthyssens (1999), the withdrawal process may
happen because the managers of the withdrawing company perceive one of the following two
types of strategic mismatch: 
1.  The  perceive  an  endogenous strategic mismatch (that  is,  the  mismatch
originates from the activities of the company itself, normally attributed to a
faulty implementation of the export strategy or a low level of commitment to
it). 
2.  They perceive that the strategic mismatch is exogenous (that is, it is due to a
rapid change in the environment and therefore originates outside the company).
Pauwels  and  Matthyssens  (1999,  page  10)  study  only  withdrawal  from  a
product/market by a single company. In our case, we could complicate the model by taking
into account that the withdrawing company may have the option or intention to withdraw
from the consortium (but not from exporting because it may have the intention to continue
exporting  on  its  own).  Or  that  it  may  have  the  intention  to  stop  exporting  altogether
(withdrawing from the consortium and stopping all exporting).
This  suggests  the  possibility  of  creating  a  2  x  2  matrix  illustrating  different
combinations that indicate different paths for strategic evolution after the company has left
the consortium.






In any case, after a certain time, a partner company’s permanent representative may
observe  that,  for  a  variety  of  reasons,  its  TMB  is  gradually  falling,  that  is,  events  are
occurring that make him feel increasingly less motivated to continue belonging to the Cexen.
As a result, a point of indifference (marked (6) in Figure 2) may be reached, at which:
TMB = TMalt
22The difference this time is that instead of reaching this point in the context of a
steady increase in TMB, the representative would reach this point in the context of steadily
decreasing TMB.
5.9. The period of exit latency. Closing events of the cycle
After reaching the threshold or point of indifference where TMB = TMalt, it is likely
that  new  events  may  occur  that  generate  further  decreases  in  the  value  of  TMB.    The
permanent representative of a partner company will become increasingly aware that there are
home-based export strategies that attract him more than the strategy of belonging to the Cexen.
Thus, the permanent representative may enter a new latency period, now called exit
latency (marked (7) in Figure 2). He may already be personally firmly convinced that the
time is approaching or has already come for his company to leave the Cexen. Yet, he does not
yet openly declare any such intention to the permanent representatives of the other partner
companies, or to the Manager of the consortium.
He may not immediately disclose his decision to leave the Cexen because he may be
waiting  for  the  right  time  to  make  such  a  public  announcement  to  the  other  partner
companies. Or because he may have some doubts and may want to wait and see if new events
confirm his perception and evaluation of the situation. Or because he wants to carry out a
“back-office process”, that is, he may want to discuss his viewpoints with other managers
within his own company to check whether they too agree that the time has indeed come to
leave the Cexen. Or because, being discontent for some reason, he decides to propose a
change in the Cexen’s operation and, if the Cexen’s Board of Directors decides not to accept
it, raise the possibility of leaving. Or because he wants to buy time to adequately prepare his
exit and subsequent activities to continue exporting on his own once he has left the Cexen
(for example, he may have to recruit an Export Manager onto his company’s staff).
As we can see, there are many possible reasons why an exit latency period may exist
between the moment when, for a particular individual partner company, TMB < TMalt, and
the moment when his/her company formally leaves the Cexen.
If  the  value  of  TMB  continues  to  diminish  relative  to  TMalt,  the  permanent
representative of the partner company in question may decide to openly inform the other
partner companies and the Cexen’s Manager of his wish to leave the consortium. This point is
marked (8) in Figure 2.
Once the announcement has been made, it is to be expected that the company that
wishes to leave and the other partner companies will initiate a round of negotiations aimed at
defining the details and the effective date on which it will cease to belong to the Cexen.
Among other things, they will have to assess the value of the shares in the Cexen
held  by  the  leaving  company.  Also,  it  may  be  necessary  to  verify  if  the  Cexen  has
accumulated losses. If so, the company which wishes to quit may be required to pay its share
of the outstanding losses.
It is also possible that, if the other partner companies wish to continue with the
Cexen, they may start a search process aimed at replacing the partner company that is leaving
with another new partner company manufacturing similar products for export.
23Finally, we should point out the apparent paradox that, in some particular cases and
circumstances, a partner company might announce its decision to leave the consortium even
though it wishes to continue to belong to it. In other words, in special circumstances a partner
company may announce that it intends to quit in spite of the fact that its TMB is still higher
that its TMalt.
For instance, in the “CIV (B)” (p. 9) and “Coextex (B)” (p. 6) case studies, situations
are described in which partner companies leave the consortium because they have gone into
temporary receivership for reasons unrelated to their membership of the consortium or their
export  activities.  The  companies  involved  might  have  preferred  to  continue  in  the
consortium, had it not been for these circumstances.
Another example is in the CIH consortium, during the period prior to dissolution,
when three of the four partners, all of them furniture manufacturers, announced, over a period
of only a few weeks, their intention to leave the consortium. The fourth partner company may
have wished to continue but, with the other three partner companies leaving, this apparently
became impossible and the consortium was dissolved.
These  or  other  similar  developments  bring  the  cycle  of  a  partner  company’s
involvement in a Cexen to a close.
Of course, as we pointed out earlier, the cycle could also end with the dissolution of
the  Cexen  itself,  after  a  process  of  negotiation  and  consensus  in  which  all  the  partner
companies decide to leave simultaneously, causing the Cexen to dissolve and to cease to
exist.
Having reached this point we may ask: Could a Cexen end in any other way? We
can give at least two potentially positive answers to this question.
First, as we pointed out above, a well designed and well managed Cexen could have
an  indefinite  duration.  It  would  simply  be  a  question  of  avoiding  the  various  extrinsic,
intrinsic, or transcendent reasons for demotivation. Steps could also be taken to increase or
revive the partner companies’ motivation.
An example of this is to be found in the CIV case study: once the four wineries in
the  consortium  had  made  a  certain  amount  of  progress  in  exporting  their  wines  to  West
Europe, a new and very ambitious challenge was proposed – to penetrate the US market.
They did this by creating a new sales subsidiary in the United States called “CIV USA Inc.”.
Presumably, the creation of this new subsidiary renewed and relaunched the motivation to
continue taking part in the Cexen, both for extrinsic reasons (the possibility of selling more in
another major export market, thereby diversifying risks) and for intrinsic reasons (learning
about how to market wines in the US). Above all, because no doubt none of the partner
companies forming the CIV export consortium was large enough or had enough resources to
create a sales subsidiary in the United States on its own.
Secondly, at least in theory, an alliance may end in a merger or acquisition of a
number of partner companies by one or more other partner companies. In short, what could
happen is a progressive integration process in which, after having coordinated their sales
activities in foreign markets through the Cexen, the partner companies decide gradually to
integrate  other  operational  areas  of  their  respective  organizations  within  the  cooperation
framework. For example, they might decide to start coordinating their sales activities in their
domestic  market,  followed  by  integrating  other  business  functions,  such  as  raw  material
purchases, quality control and assurance processes, production in a joint production unit, etc. 
24This progressive integration of the different functional areas may or may not be
accompanied by a progressive exchange of shares (8). If it is, each partner company may
gradually  acquire  a  minority  holding  in  the  other  partner  companies,  perhaps  eventually
leading to the creation of a common holding company and/or a complete merger.
Some of these stages of increased functional and financial integration may have
taken place in the consortium initially called Grupo Brotons, created in 1957 in Ibi (Alicante,
Spain).  This  group  was  made  up  of  eight  companies  in  the  toy  industry.  It  was  still  in
business in the year 2000 under the name of G.B. Fabricantes, S.L. It is the longest-lasting
consortium that this author is aware of.
In a slightly different manner, in 1996 five food and drink companies formed the
Iberasia  export  consortium  in  Dos  Hermanas,  near  Seville,  Spain,  with  the  purpose  of
exporting to Asia. In 2000, they were considering creating a new consortium, possibly to be
called Iberlat, to export to Latin America, after two new partner companies had joined.
In short, what I am trying to say is that leaving or dissolving the Cexen is not the
only strategic option available to the partner companies if they have learned not only to
export but also to cooperate actively and positively among themselves.
6. The final evaluation
As we have seen, the partner companies can take steps to renew and relaunch the
cooperative relationship and embark upon new strategic paths that prolong the Cexen’s life.
Ultimately,  however,  if  a  partner  company  leaves  the  consortium  or  the  consortium  is
dissolved,  each  of  the  leaving  companies  should  conduct  a  retrospective  assessment  and
evaluation of their participation in it.
At the end of the day the managers of each individual partner company will have to
weigh up what their company has gained from being involved in the Cexen and what it has
cost them. And as always, this should be done not only in terms of monetary contributions
and profit (extrinsic motivation) but also in terms of the learning (intrinsic motivation) and
the  “moral  balance“  (transcendent  motivation)  gained  from  the  whole  cycle  of  their
involvement in the Cexen.
Renart (1997, pages 70-73) details up to eight different, complementary ways of
measuring export success.
For example, when the four furniture manufacturers formed the CIH consortium in
1984, they were already exporting separately, with total combined export sales of about 38
million pesetas per year. In 1987, when the consortium was dissolved, they were jointly
exporting jointly some 215 million pesetas per year. And, according to the “Official Census
of Spanish Exporters - 1990” published by ICEX, in 1989 (that is, two full years after the
dissolution of the consortium), between the four of them the ex-partner companies exported
to the tune of 561 million pesetas (153 + 103 + 76 + 56 million pesetas, respectively).
25
(8) Such share exchanges cannot occur while the consortium is receiving subsidies from the ICEX from the
Institute’s Export Consortium Promotion Program. However, it could take place a posteriori, at the end of
the four-year subsidy period.This case seems to show that, in terms of export turnover and possibly in terms of
learning, each of these four companies, to a different degree, achieved a certain level of
consolidation in its exports.
In other words, involvement of a partner company in a Cexen should be assessed
and evaluated not only looking backwards in time, that is, assessing all types of benefits less
all types of costs during the Cexen’s lifetime. The assessment must also look to the future. It
must consider and evaluate the new strategic options that may now be available or feasible
for a partner company, thanks to the strategic progress made as a result of its involvement in
the Cexen.
In this sense, we may say that a successful start to exporting is merely the first step
in what may be a steady process of internationalization of the company, which has much
more far-reaching consequences. Starting from a position of not exporting, the first step is
usually to export occasionally, then to export regularly, then to establish sales subsidiaries
abroad, to start production activities abroad, and finally, to achieve the status of a global,
multinational  or  transnational  company.  Participating  in  an  export  consortium  may  be
regarded as but the first step in this long process of internationalization.
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